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Australia’s National Drug Strategy 2017–2026 is the most 
recent iteration in a long history of drug policy development, 
and commits Australia to three pillars of harm minimisation: 
demand reduction, supply reduction and harm reduction 
(Department of Health 2017). Although nationally coordinated 
by the Department of Health, both Commonwealth and 
state and territory law enforcement agencies play a key role 
across all three pillars. Annually, law enforcement expenditure 
accounts for an estimated 66 percent of all spending on drug 
policy (Shanahan & Ritter 2013), but it is the heavy investment 
in supply reduction that has received the greatest scrutiny. 
Supply reduction encompasses myriad domestic and 
international activities whose primary goal is to reduce the 
availability of illicit drugs. On an international scale, there are 
numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperative agreements 
through which intelligence gathering and interdiction 
operations seek to disrupt international trafficking from 
primary production and secondary source countries. In this 
context, Australia’s geographical position is an advantage, 
as it does not share a porous border with any of the large 
production sites in Latin America or South-East Asia. 
Abstract | Three pillars—harm reduction, 
demand reduction and supply 
reduction—underpin the harm 
minimisation framework of Australia’s 
drug policy. Much of the activity 
undertaken by law enforcement is aimed 
at reducing the availability of illicit drugs 
and thereby increasing price and 
reducing demand. This article presents a 
contemporary, systematic review of 
research exploring the price elasticity of 
demand for illicit drugs. Overall, the 
results indicate that the demand for illicit 
drugs is, on average, weakly price 
inelastic—a 10 percent increase in the 
price of illicit drugs results in a decrease 
in demand of approximately nine 
percent. The degree of elasticity varies 
by drug type, with the greatest elasticity 
indicated, albeit on a small number of 
studies, for amphetamine-type 
substances. The international differences 
seen point to a need for more Australian 
research, ideally with robust 
experimental methodologies and across 
a range of drug types. 
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Domestically, illicit drug supply reduction activities range from immigration, customs and border control 
initiatives to local-level policing strategies, each with the objective of reducing street-level supply 
by dismantling local production capabilities and disrupting internal distribution networks. These law 
enforcement activities seek not only to lessen the overall availability of illicit drugs (and reduce the 
opportunities for drug use) but also to manipulate aggregate and individual-level demand for drugs 
through market mechanisms such as an increase in price. As highlighted by Chalmers, Bradford and 
Jones (2009), supply side law enforcement is often justified on the assumption that by increasing the 
risks associated with production, transportation and trade, suppliers will be forced to compensate 
for these risks by increasing the price of their product or reducing purity. The work of Caulkins and 
Reuter (1998, 1996) and Reuter and Kleiman (1986) is particularly useful here because they highlight 
the challenging and sometimes unpredictable dynamics of drug pricing in the context of different law 
enforcement scenarios. 
The extent to which the demand for a product is influenced by its price is known in economics as the 
price elasticity of demand. The demand for a product is defined as price elastic if the proportional 
change in quantity demanded is greater than the proportional change in price. For example, if the 
quantity demanded falls by more than 10 percent in response to a 10 percent price increase, demand 
would be considered elastic. Conversely, the demand for a product is defined as price inelastic if 
the proportional change in quantity demanded is smaller than the proportional change in price. For 
mathematical completeness, unit elasticity is the case where the proportional change in quantity 
demanded is equal to the proportional change in price. Demand is considered perfectly inelastic if 
the coefficient of elasticity is 0, perfectly elastic if the coefficient of elasticity is –1, inelastic if the 
coefficient is between –1 and 0, and elastic if the coefficient is less than –1.
In the context of the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs, it is important to be clear about what 
is being estimated. As noted by Saffer and Chaloupka (1999), drug consumption survey data typically 
have a large number of observations with a value of zero, which causes econometric problems. 
Because of this, three different drug consumption concepts are commonly defined:
 • participation—a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual is or is not using drugs, 
yielding a concept known as participation elasticity (ie how levels of drug use participation 
respond to changing prices).
 • use given participation—a continuous measure of quantity of consumption but only for individuals 
who participate, yielding the most common measure of price elasticity of demand found in the 
literature—and the concept of price elasticity of demand that is the focus of this study.
 • use regardless of participation—a continuous measure of consumption for all individuals within a 
defined population, regardless of whether or not an individual uses drugs at all. This measure of 
price elasticity of demand is seldom used as population-wide survey data of drug use is rare and 
the aforementioned large number of zeros cause estimation problems.
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A key to understanding the likely effectiveness of efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs is the 
relative sensitivity and responsiveness of its users to an increase in price. This question is especially 
important because a number of law enforcement strategies have produced mixed results and in 
some cases unintended consequences. Mazerolle, Soole and Rombouts (2007) explore the research 
evidence on a series of market-level policing strategies, including ‘crackdowns’ (Davis & Lurigio 1996), 
‘police raids’ (Cohen, Gorr & Singh 2003), ‘undercover or covert operations’ (Williams et al. 2001), 
‘search and seizure’ (Pollack & Reuter 2014) and ‘high intensity policing’ activities (Piza 2018). In each 
case, the evidence was insufficient to establish an association between the strategy and a subsequent 
reduction in the size of local drug markets. 
The evidence on unintended consequences is much stronger. For example, research has shown that 
many of the aforementioned supply reduction strategies risk temporal and geographical displacement 
(moving crime to other times or places), negative impacts on local patterns of drug use and purchase, 
an increase in unsafe injecting practices and a decrease in the demand for treatment (Aitken et al. 
2002; Kerr, Small & Wood 2005; Volkmann et al. 2011; Wood et al. 2004). 
To inform policymakers about the responsiveness of drug demand to an increase in price, this 
study conducts a systematic review of research on the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs. 
Market adjustments can manifest as changes in the purity of drugs at a given price (Caulkins 2007). 
Therefore, price elasticity of demand should be interpreted alongside purity analysis. Ideally, a purity-
adjusted price should be used when estimating elasticity of demand. However, purity-adjusted prices 
can be difficult to obtain, so researchers employ a range of strategies to control for the purity of drugs 
in their estimation of demand. These strategies are discussed in more detail below. 
Method and data
This systematic review consolidates contemporary economic, drug policy and criminal justice literature 
in an attempt to quantify how demand for drugs responds to changes in drug price. There have been 
two systematic reviews previously conducted on the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs: Gallet 
(2014) and Pacula and Lundberg (2014). 
Gallet (2014) examines 42 studies which together made 462 separate observations. The author 
highlights that a number of characteristics influence the estimate of elasticity, including drug type, 
whether demand is modelled in the short- or long-run, the unit of measurement for quantity and 
price, whether alcohol and other illicit drugs are included in the specification of demand, and 
location. Characteristics that have little influence on price elasticity of demand include include the 
functional form of the demand equation (ie whether the relationship between price and quantity 
demanded is linear or logarithmic), the type of data and method used to estimate demand, and the 
quality of the publication.
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Focusing solely on marijuana use, Pacula and Lundberg (2014) assess how consumption changes in 
response to changes to price and enforcement risk, explicitly considering how this responsiveness 
varies among different user groups. The authors conclude that it is clear that the demand for 
marijuana is responsive to changes in both its monetary price and the non-pecuniary aspects of price, 
particularly those pertaining to legal risk. However, the responsiveness of demand depends on the 
type of change (price change versus criminal status change) and the type of user (light, casual, regular 
or heavy). With regard to changes in price, the authors report that for every 10 percent decline in 
price, there will be an increase of three to five percent in the number of new marijuana users aged 
under 18, an increase of 2.5 percent in the number of regular users, and an increase in the duration 
of marijuana use during adulthood.
Search strategy and study selection
Methodologically we opted to update these existing reviews with additional research material published 
between 2010 and June 2019. To systematise this, we searched for keywords across six separate 
databases: Scopus, Web of Science, Criminal Justice Abstracts, PsycInfo, EconLit and Google Scholar. 
We were interested in four types of illicit drugs, including marijuana/cannabis, cocaine, heroin and 
methamphetamine. Thus, our search terms were as follows:
drug* OR marijuana OR cannabis OR cocaine OR heroin OR methamphetamine OR amphetamine
AND price OR demand OR elasticity
AND NOT medic* AND NOT pharma*
We limited our search to peer-reviewed journal articles published in English. This initial search yielded 
1,157 studies. After title screening, a sub-sample of 474 studies were retained as being relevant to 
illicit drugs and illicit drug markets. Of these 474 studies, 14 studies not reviewed by either Gallet 
(2014) or Pacula and Lundberg (2014) included specific analysis of price elasticities, and 12 of these 
studies estimated the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs. A PRISMA diagram illustrating the 
search process is provided in the Appendix (Figure A1).
The illegal nature of illicit drugs makes studying the price elasticity of demand difficult; as such, 
most studies rely on survey data or data gathered via behavioural economic experiments. In surveys, 
respondents typically self-report their level of use over the last 12 months or 30 days. Consumption 
is treated as a binary variable, coded ‘1’ if the individual uses a drug and ‘0’ otherwise. These studies 
examine the impact of price on the decision to use drugs and report participation elasticity rather 
than the price elasticity of demand. 
With experimental data, drug users respond to a series of hypothetical price changes, indicating 
whether or not they would use and, if they decided to use, how much they would use. From this data 
the impact of a (hypothetical) change in price on quantity consumed (ie price elasticity of demand) 
can be estimated (see, for example, Aston et al. 2016; Collins et al. 2014; and Olmstead et al. 2015).  
A further source of data from which price elasticity of demand can be estimated is crowdsourced data 
on actual transactions, including data on price, quantity traded and possibly quality (see, for example, 
Davis, Geisler & Nichols 2016). These data, however, are subjective and based on unqualified user 
reports. They are therefore not suitable for estimating price elasticity of demand.
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As noted above, we focus solely on price elasticity of demand, treating consumption as a continuous 
scale. The argument for not including participation elasticity is that this measure does not take into 
account the price responsiveness of regular or heavy users, who, according to data from the 2001 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, account for 71 percent of total drug purchases (Caulkins 
& Pacula 2006). We identified 35 studies (23 identified by Gallet (2014) and 12 more recent studies) 
that estimate price elasticity of demand (Table 1). Several studies report multiple estimates of price 
elasticity, depending on empirical specification. In Table 1 we report the median estimate from 
each study for each drug type. This approach is consistent with that of Gallet (2014). The advantage 
of using the median (as opposed to the mean) is that the median is less affected by outliers and 
a skewed distribution, particularly when the number of elasticity estimates in each study is small. 
Unlike Gallet (2014), we exclude elasticity estimates for suppliers from the median calculation 
because suppliers are not representative of drug users. 
Results
Figures 1 and 2 present the number of studies classified by drug type and location. As shown in 
Figure 1, a large number of studies focus on the price elasticity of demand for heroin. More recent 
research effort has been devoted to estimating the responsiveness of marijuana consumption to 
changes in price. Although no studies focus exclusively on methamphetamine, five of the nine studies 
that estimate price elasticity of demand for a number of drugs include methamphetamine or 
amphetamine-type substances. As shown in Figure 2, the majority of studies were conducted in the 
United States, Norway and Australia, with one recent study conducted in South Africa.





0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
2010–2019Gallet (2014)
Note: Some studies examine multiple drug types; therefore the categories are not mutually exclusive and the total number of studies in this figure exceeds 35
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Figure 2: Price elasticity of demand studies, by location (n)







Table 1 reports the median price elasticity of demand from each study by drug type. This yields 44 
median elasticities of demand for illicit drugs. Taking the average of these 44 yields a mean elasticity 
of demand for all drugs of approximately –0.9, indicating that demand for illicit drugs is inelastic—
that is, the quantity demanded is not very sensitive to changes in price. In other words, a 10 percent 
increase in price would reduce the quantity demanded by approximately nine percent. This estimate 
is different to the figure of –0.33 reported by Gallet (2014), because Gallet (2014) combined both 
participation elasticity and elasticity of demand. Approximately half of the studies cited in Gallet 
(2014) focus on participation elasticity, which is typically lower than the price elasticity of demand. 
Pacula and Lundberg (2014) report participation elasticities ranging from –0.002 to –0.69.
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Table 1: Overview of studies on price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs













Nisbet & Vakil (1972) M US Yes –0.30
Caulkins (1995) C, H US –0.30 –0.36

















Liu et al. (1999) H Taiwan –0.93
Caulkins (2001) C, H US –0.84 –1.30
Petry (2001) C US Yes –1.15








H, A Norway –0.99 –0.22
Sumnall et al. (2004) C, A UK –2.44 –2.21






Chandra & Swoboda 
(2008)
M, H India –0.70 –0.33
Jofre-Bonet & Petry 
(2008)
C, H US Yes –0.90 –0.90
Chalmers, Bradford 
& Jones (2009)
A, H Australia Yes –2.11 –1.82
Roddy & Greenwald 
(2009)
H US –0.64
Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice
Australian Institute of Criminology
8No. 606 October 2020
Table 1: Overview of studies on price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs (cont.)















A, H Australia Yes –1.73 –1.66
Clements, Lan & 
Zhou (2010)
M Australia –0.65
Collins et al. (2014) M US Yes –1.75
Olmstead et al. 
(2015)
H US –0.80
Chandra & Chandra 
(2015)
H India –0.34
Lakhdar, Vaillant & 
Wolff (2016)
M France –1.90
Davis, Geisler & 
Nichols (2016)
M US –0.73
Aston et al. (2016) M US –0.05
Halcoussis, 
Lowenberg & Roof 
(2017)
M US –0.42
Thompson & Koichi 
(2017)
C, A US –0.10 0.51
Vincent et al. (2017) M US Yes –1.37
Vitaliano (2018) H US –1.00





Average (mean) –0.94 –0.84 –0.79 –1.08
a: Full citations for these studies are provided in the Appendix, Table A1
Types of drugs
The average price elasticities of heroin, cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine in our study are 
–0.9, –0.84, –0.79 and –1.08 respectively. Consistent with Gallet (2014), among the illicit drug types, 
demand for marijuana is the least price-sensitive. A study by Chandra and Swoboda (2008) also shows 
that marijuana use is less responsive to price change than heroin use. As marijuana is considered a 
‘soft drug’, while heroin and cocaine are ‘hard drugs’ and more susceptible to drug dependency, at 
first glance this result appears counterintuitive. However, Gallet (2014) argues that a typical hard drug 
user would have more experience in the illicit drug market, and more information about drug prices 
and the availability of substitutes. 
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Figure 3 reveals the range of estimates of price elasticity of demand for heroin, cocaine, marijuana 
and methamphetamine. Methamphetamine has the largest variation, ranging from –1.82 to 0.51. 
Only Thompson and Koichi (2017) report a positive median price elasticity of demand for any drug—
0.51 for methamphetamine. This suggests that methamphetamine may be a Giffen good (a product 
for which demand increases as price increases and demand falls when price falls), although the 
authors do not use purity-adjusted price for their elasticity estimates. 











Purity and quality of drugs
Thompson and Koichi (2017) argue that the positive elasticity for methamphetamine may be due 
to an increase in the quality of methamphetamine. Using Australian data, Scott, Caulkins, Ritter and 
Dietze (2015) also find that the price of and demand for methamphetamine has increased, a paradox 
that can be solved when purity is taken into account. Further evidence of the relationship between 
drug purity and price elasticity of demand is provided by Vincent et al. (2017), who find that demand 
for low grade marijuana is more price elastic (–1.97) than demand for higher grade marijuana (–1.11). 
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Ideally, to estimate price elasticity of demand, purity-adjusted price should be used. According to 
Bretteville-Jensen and Biørn (2004), police seizures show large variation in heroin and amphetamine 
purity at the wholesale level but little variation at the retail level. However, the purity is often unknown 
to the users at the time of purchase, so actual purity-adjusted prices may not be that important.  
What matters to demand is the perceived quality at the time of purchase rather than the actual quality. 
Researchers employ several techniques to control for drug quality when estimating the relationship 
between price and demand and their corresponding elasticities. For example, Bretteville-Jensen 
(2006) employs drug prices reported by participants and adjusted for decreases in heroin purity 
registered at the import level since 2000, whereas Olmstead et al. (2015) estimate elasticity of 
demand for high- and low-quality heroin separately. In the context of cannabis, Lakhdar, Vaillant 
and Wolff (2016) include both perceived quality and actual potency (based on the concentration of 
tetrahydrocannabinol) as control variables in their demand function regression.
Geographical differences
Price elasticity of demand appears to be country-specific. Table 1 shows that the average price elasticity 
of demand for heroin in the United States is –0.79, while in Australia and Norway it is –1.92 and 
–1.08 respectively. This implies that US heroin users tend to be less sensitive to price changes than 
either Australian or Norwegian users. 
Among studies that investigate price elasticity of demand for heroin, Olmstead et al. (2015) employ 
an innovative dataset that combines longitudinal data collected daily from 120 US regular heroin 
users and experimental data. The authors employ two empirical strategies to estimate price elasticity 
of demand. The first strategy is to examine the longitudinal pattern of drug purchasing, exploiting 
the within-individual idiosyncratic variation in price. The second strategy uses experimental data 
and exploits an experimentally induced variation in price. Both strategies yield an estimated price 
elasticity of demand of –0.8. This estimate is consistent with the average of the other US-based 
heroin studies (–0.79). While there is a sizeable difference in heroin price elasticity between the US 
and Australian markets, average elasticities for marijuana are similar (–0.77 vs. –0.67).
With regard to cocaine, most studies in the US market report inelastic demand (elasticities are 
negative and less than one in absolute value), with the exception of Caulkins (2001) and Petry (2001). 
Our review identified one additional UK-based study, which estimates the price elasticity of demand 
for cocaine (–2.44) and for amphetamine (–2.21; Sumnall et al. 2004). Thus, while demand for 
cocaine in the United States appears to be inelastic, the limited available evidence from the United 
Kingdom suggests a higher price elasticity of demand.
User effects
According to Pacula and Lundberg (2014), different types of drug users respond differently to 
changes in price. Four groups of users are identified: initiators and light users, regular users, heavy 
users, and quitters. For marijuana, initiation among youth is sensitive to changes in price, with initiation 
(or participation) elasticity ranging from –0.002 to –0.69. With regard to regular marijuana users, 
Nisbet and Vakil’s (1972) study, albeit dated, estimated the elasticity of demand (capturing the change 
in consumption among those already using marijuana) to be approximately –0.3. The participation 
elasticity of this group is approximately –0.7 to –1.0, resulting in a total elasticity of demand ranging 
from –1.01 to –1.51. 
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Clements and Zhao (2009), as cited in Pacula and Lundberg (2014), estimate elasticity for regular 
users as –0.4. Aston et al. (2016) report elasticity of demand among frequent marijuana users as 
–0.04 (whole sample), –0.055 (users without symptoms of dependence) and –0.038 (users with 
symptoms of dependence). There has been little research into the behaviour of heavy users, although 
Lakhdar, Vaillant and Wolff (2016) estimate elasticity of demand for marijuana in a sample of 250 heavy 
(near daily) users in France. They report short-run elasticity ranging from –1.7 to –2.1—much higher 
estimates than appear elsewhere in the literature. 
Gender effects
There appears to be a gender difference in responsiveness to changes in the price of illicit drugs. 
Bretteville-Jensen (1999) suggests that women are more price-sensitive than men. The author 
estimates heroin demand equations for females and males separately. Regression results show that 
price elasticity of demand is –1.9 among females and –1.5 among males. Gallet (2014), however, finds 
no gender differences in price elasticity. 
Cross-price elasticities
When estimating the demand function for a given drug type, some studies control for the price of 
alcohol, tobacco or other illicit drugs, reporting their respective cross-price elasticities. Gallet (2014) 
indicates that controlling for the impact of the cross-price elasticity of alcohol (other illicit drugs) on 
the own-price elasticity of a given drug will inflate (or deflate) the own-price elasticity. Olmstead et al. 
(2015) suggest that marijuana and heroin are neither complements nor substitutes, whereas cocaine 
and heroin are complements. In this context, a complement is a drug for which demand increases 
when a similar drug becomes cheaper (ie people use both drugs and, as one becomes cheaper, the 
other also increases in demand). A substitute is a drug whose demand increases when the price 
of another drug increases (ie users switch to substitutes when their preferred drug becomes more 
expensive). Saffer and Chaloupka (1999) also propose that cocaine and heroin are complements. 
Thompson and Koichi (2017) find that past marijuana consumption does not increase current cocaine 
or heroin consumption. Changes in marijuana price also do not affect consumption of these two drugs. 
Marijuana, however, is a weak complement to methamphetamine. There is little evidence of drug 
substitution from heroin to methamphetamine, despite declines in the purity-adjusted price of 
methamphetamine (Scott et al. 2015).
Types of data
Elasticity estimates depend on the type of data used. Estimates from experimental data tend to be 
larger in absolute value, compared to estimates from historical or crowdsourced data. This finding 
is consistent with Gallet (2014). For example, with regard to the US marijuana market, Davis et al. 
(2016) report elasticity ranging from –0.67 to –0.79 using crowdsourced data, whereas Collins et 
al. (2014) and Vincent et al. (2017) report higher elasticities of –1.75 and –1.37 respectively using 
experimental data.
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A final potential driver of variation in price elasticity of demand is whether short-run or long-run price 
elasticity is being estimated. The length of time people have to respond to price changes affects the 
elasticity of demand. In general, demand tends to be more elastic in the long-run because people 
have more time to notice the change in price and act accordingly (Mankiw 2004). Consistent with 
Gallet (2014), we also find that demand for drugs is more elastic in the long run. 
Discussion
Supply reduction is one of three pillars underpinning Australia’s commitment to harm minimisation 
within the National Drug Strategy 2017–2026. Supply reduction has two principal aims: to curb onset 
and consumption by limiting opportunities for drug use, and to reduce drug use by manipulating 
the drug market in ways that discourage use and reduce demand. In econometric studies of illicit 
drug markets, price is an important market characteristic which has the potential to influence the 
behaviour of drug users. However, the extent to which drug users are, in fact, sensitive to price 
changes remains the subject of some debate. In this study, we systematically review and consolidate 
the most recent available empirical evidence on the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs. To do 
this, we extend an earlier review by Gallet (2014) with an additional 12 articles published between 
2010 and June 2019.
Together these studies suggest that the demand for illicit drugs is, on average, weakly price inelastic. 
By our estimate, a 10 percent increase in the price of illicit drugs results in a decrease in demand 
of approximately nine percent. Although technically inelastic, this result suggests law enforcement 
activities that increase drug prices can have a substantial effect on the quantity demanded—almost 
a one-to-one relationship. This estimate is considerably higher (ie more elastic) than was estimated 
by Gallet (2014). However, as mentioned earlier, Gallet’s sample included a number of studies that 
estimated the price elasticity of participation, and participation elasticity is typically lower than 
consumption elasticity (Pacula & Lundberg 2014). 
By drug type, price elasticity of demand is highest for methamphetamine (an average of –1.08—
indicating elastic demand). However, this estimate is based on a small number of studies (five in total, 
including two from Australia) and it should therefore be interpreted with caution. Using a behavioural 
economic approach in an Australian context, Chalmers, Bradford and Jones (2010, 2009) suggest that 
methamphetamine is highly price elastic, particularly among those who are not drug-dependent (an 
elasticity of –1.66; n=101). Methamphetamine is also found to be price elastic in the United Kingdom 
but inelastic in the US and Norwegian markets. 
Given the relatively small number of studies estimating the price elasticity of demand for 
methamphetamine and the growing social harms caused by this type of drug, there is a strong case for 
the development of a well-designed experimental study. Such a study should be multi-jurisdictional, 
include purity or quality adjustments, attempt to estimate the degree of substitution between 
methamphetamine and other drugs, and explore the price sensitivities of different user groups. 
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Demand for all other drug types was assessed as inelastic, and the link between price and demand 
was weakest for marijuana (an average of –0.79), followed by cocaine (–0.84) and heroin (–0.94). 
Consistent with earlier analyses and with economic theory, price elasticity of demand tends to be 
lower in the short-run than in the long-run. Further, it appears that the relative purity of a substance 
matters, and that some of the apparent inelasticity between price and demand may be explained by 
fluctuations in purity or quality. 
Although the number of studies included in this systematic review is relatively small, a number of 
important trends are worth noting. First, price elasticity of demand appears to be specific to the local 
or regional context. This makes it difficult to translate the findings from one country to another or 
from one market to another, even within Australia. This geographical variability points to a number of 
important local conditions that likely impact the relative effectiveness of law enforcement strategies 
seeking to manipulate drug price as a mechanism for curbing demand. 
Second, a change in price is not experienced or responded to equally by all drug users. Price 
increases, for example, are likely to have a greater impact on existing users than on potential new 
users. Third, it appears female drug users are more sensitive to price changes than male drug users. 
Finally, cross-drug substitution is a feature of drug market activity that likely affects the calculation of 
demand elasticities. The extent to which drug users are prepared to switch between drugs as relative 
prices change should be the subject of future research. 
Although in this analysis we focus on price elasticity of demand, it is important to acknowledge that 
price increases are not the only possible outcome of a reduction in supply. Suppliers may alter their 
drug market strategies in a number of other ways, some of which can significantly increase harm 
rather than reduce it. For example, to maintain street-level supply at consistent prices, suppliers may 
increase the use of cutting agents and other adulterants. By decreasing the purity of their product, 
suppliers can manage short-term supply reductions, albeit at significant detriment to the health of 
their customers. The demand reduction benefit of any supply reduction strategy must be weighed 
against these other potential outcomes and the hidden harms that can result.
Further, the measure of elasticity in drug markets cannot be considered in isolation from the 
cost (both financial and social) of producing the requisite changes in supply. As noted earlier, law 
enforcement is responsible for approximately two-thirds of current expenditure in drug policy 
(Shanahan & Ritter 2013) and many drug market interventions are of limited or unknown benefit 
(Mazerolle, Soole & Rombouts 2007). In addition, law enforcement activities have been shown 
to result in a number unintended and sometimes negative consequences to both drug users and 
the wider community. Any quantitative or qualitative assessment of price elasticity should not be 
interpreted in isolation of the cost of reducing supply. Indeed, it would be important for future 
research to consider the relative benefit of supply reduction strategies when weighed against their 
financial and non-financial costs.
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